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Printz v. United States: Tenth Amendment
Limitations on Federal Access to the

Mechanisms of State Government

In Printz v. United States,' the Supreme Court addressed the Tenth
Amendment's protection of state sovereignty, a significant issue in the
contemporary debate on the nature of United States federalism.
Striking a key provision of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act 2
("Brady Act") as unconstitutional, the Court expanded Tenth Amendment limitations on the federal government's access to the mechanisms
of state government. The Court decision implicated issues bearing on
the commerce power and the power of Congress to enlist state compliance with federal policy objectives.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Under the commerce power, Congress passed the Brady Act in 1993
as a response to an "'epidemic of gun violence'" afflicting the nation?
Passed as an amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 the Brady
Act sought to undermine the transfer of firearms to certain persons
enumerated by the Gun Control Act The class includes persons who
are under the age of twenty-one, persons who do not reside in the
dealer's state, and persons who are otherwise prohibited by state and
local law from purchasing or possessing firearms? Sections 922(d) and
(g) include a number of other persons in the class as well.7

1. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994).
3. 117 S. Ct. at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-344, at 8
(1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.N. 1985).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994).
5. 117 S. Ct. at 2368-69.
6. Ild. at 2368.
7. Id. Other proscribed persons include:
convicted felons, fugitives from justice, unlawful users of controlled substances,
persons adjudicated as mentally defective or committed to mental institutions,
aliens unlawfully present in the United States, persons dishonorably discharged
from the Armed Forces, persons who have renounced their citizenship, and
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To prevent the transfer of firearms to prohibited individuals, the
Brady Act mandates the establishment of a national system for checking
the backgrounds of prospective handgun purchasers.' The Brady Act
requires the Attorney General to have a permanent federal system in
place by November 30, 1998." As an interim measure, the Brady Act
immediately enlists the service of local chief law enforcement officers
("CLEOs").'0 Firearm dealers are required to obtain a prospective
handgun purchaser's name, address, birth date, and sworn statement
that the prospective purchaser is legally eligible to purchase a firearm
under sections 922(b), (d), and (g). The firearm dealer must then provide
that information to the CLEO." Section 922(s)(2) obliges the CLEO to
use the information to "'make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5
business days whether receipt or possession [of a handgun by the
prospective purchaser] would be in violation of the law.""' 2 State law
would then impose a duty on CLEOs to prevent prohibited firearm
transfers.13
The petitioners, CLEOs from counties in Montana and Arizona,14
objected to section 922(s)(2) and to subsequent provisions that required
them either to destroy records in their possession relating to a handgun
transfer that was deemed legal or to inform prospective purchasers upon
request and in writing why the transfer was denied.1" They argued
that the Brady Act unconstitutionally pressed them, as state officers,
into federal service by compelling them to execute a federal program.'"
In Printz v. United States," the United States District Court for the
District of Montana permanently enjoined the United States from
enforcing section 922(s)(2), declaring it unconstitutional and void.' 8
Likewise, in Mack v. United States,'9 the United States District Court

persons who have been subjected to certain restraining orders or been convicted
of a misdemeanor offense involving domestic violence.

Id.
8. Id.
9. Id
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id at 2368-69.
Id. at 2369.
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C, § 822(sX2) (1994)).
Id
Id.

Id
Id. at 2369-70.
854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994).
Id. at 1519-20.
856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994).
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for the District of Arizona declared section 922(s)(2) unconstitutional and
permanently enjoined its enforcement.so
The Arizona and Montana cases were consolidated, and in Mack v.
United States, 21 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the
district courts' permanent injunctions enjoining the enforcement of
section 922(s)(2) and reversed the district court rulings holding the
section unconstitutional.' In Printz, the Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit.' The Court held those federal directives unconstitutional that require either the officers of the states or the officers of the
political subdivisions24 of the states to administer or enforce federal
regulatory programs.
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Printz is the latest development in a line of Supreme Court cases that
arguably begins with then Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Fry v. United
States.2 5 In Fry the Court affirmed an injunction preventing Ohio from
giving certain state employees a pay raise of 10.6%.' The Economic
Stabilization Act of 197027 allowed the President to regulate salaries
and wages, and the Pay Board formed under the Act had limited wage
and salary increases to 5.5%. 28 Petitioners in Fry argued that the Act
violated the Tenth Amendment because it interfered with sovereign state
functions.29 Continuing a line of decisions that had been expanding the
scope of the commerce power since the New Deal, the majority disagreed,
holding that there was no Tenth Amendment violation in congressional
regulation of state-employed workers' pay.'

20. Id. at 1383-84.
21. 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995).
22. Id. at 1034.
23. 117 S. Ct. at 2384.
24. Id.
25. 421 U.S. 542, 549 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Given the nature of United
States federalism, an earlier starting point can always be suggested. See discussion infra
Part IV. But because he was as yet a new voice on the Court in 1975 and because he
survives to see the latter twentieth century Court's position on the federal nature of the
United States, using Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Fry as a starting point well illustrates
federalisms movement away from the mid-twentieth century centralization processes--associated with the New Deal, World War H, the Great Society, and the Cold
War-that were at their height when Justice Rehnquist joined the Court.
26. 421 U.S. at 548.
27. 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1970) (expired Apr. 30, 1974). See also 421 U.S. at 544 n.1.
28. 421 U.S. at 543-44.
29. Id. at 547.
30. Id. at 548.
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Justice Rehnquist's primary concern in his dissent was the lack of a
state "constitutional counterweight" to Congress's use of the commerce
power to regulate internal state matters.3' Justice Rehnquist's dissent
in Fry can be read as a demand for boundaries that would clearly
delineate state and federal power, boundaries that would be "constitutionally unassailable and presumably safeguarded from federal
intrusion." 2 As a solution to the apparent imbalance in the division of
power between the federal government and the states, Justice Rehnquist
argued that the line between federal and state power should be drawn
where federal legislative action interfered with a state's exercise of its
traditional governmental functions. 3
Writing for a bare majority in National League of Cities v. Usey,"
Justice Rehnquist constitutionalized his dissent in Fry. In National
League of Cities, the Court held that while Congress could touch many
different activities through its commerce power, even many wholly
intrastate activities, Congress was nevertheless obliged to recognize the
different footing upon which the states stand as opposed to the footing
of private commerce, which Congress could otherwise regulate through
the commerce power." The New Deal era witnessed a tremendous
expansion of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, but the
Court curtailed this expansion in National League of Cities by preventing Congress from extending the national minimum wage standard to
state employees.s
The Tenth Amendment, the Court noted in Fry, was aimed at
protecting the ability of the states "to function effectively in a federal
system.' 3 In NationalLeague of Cities, the Court explained that the
effective functioning of a state within the federal system is dependent
upon the state retaining control over its own sovereignty and that the
Constitution thus requires Congress to refrain from interfering with the
s The Court held that the provisions
traditional functions of the states.M
of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974,"' which applied the

31. Id at 552 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
32.

STANLEY

FRIEDELBAUM, THE REHNQUIST COURT:

IN PURSUIT OF JUDICIAL

CONSERVATISM 4 (1994).

33. 421 U.S. at 558 n.2.

34. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
35. Id at 854.
36. Id. at 851-52.
37. Id. (quoting Fry, 421 U.S. at 547 n.7).
38. Id. at 844-45.
39. Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.). The Fair Labor Standards Amendments relevant to National League of Cities are
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1994).
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national minimum wage standard to the wages of a number of state
workers, crossed the federal-state boundary, upsetting the balance of
power between the two.' The Court also noted in dictum that just as
the commerce power does not allow Congress to transgress the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury or the Fifth Amendment right to due
process, the commerce power does not allow Congress to violate the
sovereignty reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment."1
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,"2 the
Court again addressed allegations of federal encroachment on state
sovereignty when it considered the Surface Mining Control and
In order to alleviate the
Reclamation Act ("Surface Mining Act").
social and environmental problems caused by surface mining, the
Surface Mining Act provided for an initial interim phase of federal
regulation in which states were allowed to participate and for a
permanent secondary phase under which states were given the option of
regulating nonfederal lands within their borders subject to the approval
of the Secretary of the Interior." Otherwise, the Department of the
Interior would promulgate and enforce a regulatory program for the
state.4 5 In an attempt to clarify the concept of a traditional governmental function, the Court in Hodel outlined a three-part test for commerce
power challenges." The Court stated that a successful challenge would
7
show that the challenged statute regulated the "'States as States,"'4
that the challenged statute was directed at indisputable "'attribute[s] of
state sovereignty,'4o and that state compliance with the statute would
"directly impair [its] ability 'to structure integral operation in areas of
traditional governmental functions."' 49 The challenge to the Surface
Mining Act failed on the first element of the test because it did not
And
regulate the states at all; it regulated the mining industry.'
insofar as the Surface Mining Act touched the states, it did not regulate
them but invited them to participate in "cooperative federalism." 1

40. See 426 U.S. at 852.
41. Id. at 841-43.

42.
43.
U.S.C.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

452 U.S. 264 (1981).

Id. at 268. The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act is codified at 30
§§ 1201-1328 (1994).
452 U.S. at 268-72.
1& at 270-72.
Id. at 287-88.
Id. at 287 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854).
Id. at 288 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845).

49. Id. (quoting NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852).
50. Id at 289.
51. 1d
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In FERC v. Mississippi," the majority named cooperative federalism
as an element of its rationale for upholding the Public Utilities
Regulatory Policies Act ("PURPA") of 1978' against charges of a Tenth
Amendment violation."
Under PURPA, state energy regulatory
authorities were required to adopt policies consistent with congressional
desire to encourage the development of alternative sources of energy."
The Court held it would be constitutionally acceptable for a state's
failure to act in accord with federal policy to result in federal preemption
of the state's authority to regulate energy utilities." In her dissenting
opinion, Justice O'Connor said that she believed PURPA fell far short of
the cooperative federalism that the Court identified in Hodel." Justice
O'Connor's dissent in FERCillustrated the Hodel test's insufficiency as
a jurisprudential tool for identifying traditional state functions. She
asserted that the Court's rationale for its decision had the effect of
giving the states an absurd choice." Regarding utility regulation as a
traditional state function, Justice O'Connor saw Congress requiring the
states to either comply with federal regulatory policy or refrain from
performing a traditional state function altogether.5" She stated that
because PURPA gave the states no real choice, PURPA had the effect of
conscripting state legislatures into federal service.' The great evil that
Justice O'Connor saw in federal conscription of state legislatures-the
"blur[ring] [of] the lines of political accountability 1-- would be
addressed in the Court's next significant federalism decision.
Three years after the Court handed down its decision in FERC, it
decided Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority," which
addressed the problem of identifying traditional governmental functions
that FERC had left conspicuously unresolved. Writing for the Court,
Justice Blackmun rejected "as unsound in principle and unworkable in
practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on
a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is

52.

456 U.S. 742 (1982).

53. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3119 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and
16 U.S.C.).
54. 456 U.S. at 767.

55. Id. at 750-51.
56. Id. at 764-65.
57. Id at 783 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing 452 U.S. at
289).

58. Id. at 781.
59. Id. at 781 n.7.
60. Id. at 779.
61. Id. at 787.
62. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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The Court expressly overruled National
'integral' or 'traditional."''
League of Cities" and identified the constitutionally prescribed means
of protecting state sovereignty in the democratic processes that sustain
the structures of the federal government." It is perhaps best to
understand this as a constitutionalization of the corollary to Chief
Justice Marshall's rationale in McCulloch v. Maryland." More than a
century before Garcia, the Court held that the Maryland state government could not impose its policy on the United States because the
Maryland government was not answerable to the people of the United
States whom Maryland presumed to tax by taxing the United States
Bank.67 The government of the United States, on the other hand, is
answerable to the people of Maryland and likewise to the people of all
states of the union." Questions regarding the imposition of federal
policy on the states are thus ultimately political in nature, and the
sovereignty of the individual states is ultimately secured by the political
activity of citizens acting in their alternative roles as citizens of the
United States and as citizens of the various states. 9 Arguably, Garcia
gave federal power the most generous rein ever accorded it by the Court,
but the generosity of the Garcia rule would prove short-lived.
Addressing provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985 ("Radioactive Waste Act")" in New York v.
United States,71 the Court handed down a decision that played off the
structural role of the states enunciated in Garciabut that constituted a
distinctive shift in the Court's attitude toward the exercise of federal
power. Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor labeled as "most severe"
a provision that required states to take title to low-level radioactive
wastes and to become liable for those wastes generated within their
borders if they had not provided for their disposal in accord with federal
directives by 1996.2 Consistent with her dissent in FERC, Justice
O'Connor viewed the choice given state energy commissions in the "take
title" provision of the Radioactive Waste Act as meaningless. 7 The
Court identified the constitutional problem with the Radioactive Waste

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 546-47.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 550.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1824).
Id. at 436.
Id.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-51.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2021(b)-2023 (1994).
505 U.S. 144, 149-52 (1992).
Id. at 153-54.
Id. at 177.
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Act as an absence of congressional accountability in a process that
effectively amounted to congressional commandeering of the state
legislative process.7 ' Rather than taking responsibility for its own
policy, Congress used the Radioactive Waste Act to hide federal policy
behind requirements that the states enact legislation. 5 Following the
Court's re-interpretation of the Garciarule in New York, Congress would
have to be directly exposed to the political repercussions of its policies." It may thus be appropriate to understand the New York rule as
a version of the Garciarule, but with teeth in that it prohibits congressional utilization of state legislative processes to achieve federal policy
goals. Thus where Garcia gave free rein to congressional exercise of
federal power, New York put real limits on the exercise of such power.
This review of the legal background of Printz indicates an ongoing
shift that has taken place in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
nature of United States federalism over the last thirty years. Centralization of power in the federal government became the standard during
the New Deal era and continued well into the latter years of the
twentieth century, but as early as Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Fry,
there was a voice on the Court stirring it to recognize the Tenth
Amendment's protection of state sovereignty. After struggling to
conceptualize Tenth Amendment protection of state sovereignty, the
Court resorted to a political test that had been implied in the federalist
debate since Chief Justice Marshall headed the Court more than a
century ago. Then after the Cold War ended with the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991, the Court took a position in New York that was
decidedly adverse to the trend of centralization that had dominated the
Court's thinking about federalism for most of the twentieth century, and
it is at this point in history that the Court handed down its decision in
Printz.
Ill. THE COURT'S RATIONALE
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for five members of the Court,
identifying the question before the Court as the constitutionality of
"congressional action compelling state officers to execute federal
laws."7 Justice Scalia addressed three interpretive sources of constitutional meaning to frame the answer: early congressional legislative
practice, constitutional structure, and judicial precedent.7"

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. IU.

77. 117 S. Ct. at 2369-70.
78. Id. at 2370.
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The Court first considered whether the early Congress contemplated
federal legislation that imposed federal duties on state officers.79
Responding to the dissents argument that the early Congress assumed
the power to utilize state governmental machinery as a matter of course,
Justice Scalia replied that early federal legislation "appear[ed] to rest on
the natural assumption that the States would consent to allowing their
officials to assist the Federal Government."' In other words, rather
than a constitutionally based power to access the mechanisms of state
government, the Court interpreted the Constitution as requiring any
federal access to state governmental machinery to be contingent upon
state consent to such access. Justice Scalia stated that the early
Congress imposed nonconsensual duties only on state judicial officers,
whom the Supremacy Clause obliged to adjudicate federal law."
The second phase of the Court's decision dealt with the federal
constitutional structure, which the Court identified as incontestably one
of dual sovereignty."' The Court decided that the system of dual
sovereignty depends upon both levels of separation of power created by
the Constitution: the division of power between the federal government
and the state governments' and the division of power between the
legislative and the executive branches of the federal government.8
Concluding that the Brady Act violated the separation of power
provisions at both levels, 5 the Court held that Congress had unconstitutionally circumvented the separation of power between itself and the
President by transferring the power to execute federal law to CLEOs."
Furthermore, the Court held that the Brady Act jeopardized dual
sovereignty by threatening to upset the division of power between
federal and state governments. The Court explained that "[tihe power
of the Federal Government would be augmented immeasurably if it were
able to impress into its service-and at no cost to itself-the police
officers of the 50 states."87
In considering whether Congress had the power to enact the provisions
of the Brady Act in question, the Court also addressed the scope of the
Necessary and Proper Clause of the United States Constitution."

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

I& at 2370-72.
Id at 2372.
Id. at 2371.
Id. at 2376 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991)).
Id at 2377-78.
Id. at 2378.

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.

88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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Justice Scalia underscored Justice Rehnquist's dictum in National
League of Cities, in which the Court stated that just as the commerce
power does not allow Congress to transgress the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights of individuals, the commerce power does not allow
Congress to violate the sovereignty reserved to the states by the Tenth
Amendment. 9 Justice Scalia allowed that the Necessary and Proper
Clause empowers Congress to enact such legislation as is necessary and
proper to effectuate its limited legislative powers, but he reasoned that
because Congress is not empowered to violate the sovereignty of states,
congressional legislative acts that violate the Tenth Amendment,, as did
the Brady Act, cannot be necessary and proper."
In the third phase of its argument, the Court reviewed its own
precedent and dramatically expanded its holding in New York v. United
States. Arguing for the constitutionality of the Brady Act in Printz, the
United States tried to distinguish the provisions of section 922(s)(2) from
those of the Radioactive Waste Act of 1985.91 The United States took
the position that while the Radioactive Waste Act required the state
legislatures to make policy that the federal legislature had predetermined, the Brady Act imposed no policy-making requirements.9 2
Rather, the Brady Act "issue[d] a final directive to state CLEOs.'95 The
Government urged that it is constitutionally acceptable to require state
CLEOs to perform non-policy-making, federally imposed duties because
Congress crosses the constitutional line "'only when [it] compels the
States to make law in their sovereign capacity."''
The Court disagreed. Policy-making decisions, Justice Scalia stated,
are implicit in the role CLEOs are required to play in the implementation of the Brady Act."' For example, the Brady Act implicitly obliges
CLEOs to determine the amount of departmental resources they will
divert toward fulfillment of their duties under the Act, and decisions
regarding the allocation of funds are necessarily policy-oriented. 6 The
Brady Act also directs CLEOs to make "reasonable" efforts to determine
whether proposed firearm transactions were legal thus requiring CLEOs

89. 117 S. Ct. at 2379.
90. Id. Justice Scalia's argument has what might be considered a tautological
structure. See id
91. Id. at 2380.
92. Id,
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent at 16, Printz v. United States, 117 U.S. 2365
(1997)).
95. Id. at 2380-81.
96. Id. at 2381.
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Justice
to determine what amount of effort would be reasonable.'
Scalia asked, "Is this decision ... not preeminently a matter of
policy?7
Furthermore, the Court stated, the decisions of policy foisted upon
state CLEOs by the Brady Act entail fiscal and political burdens for the
The financial burden for making the reasonable efforts
states."
necessary to determine the legitimacy of prospective firearm transfers
would be borne by the states."° And the CLEOs, many of whom are
locally elected officials, would face the potential political burdens
associated with the erroneous prevention of a handgun transfer.'0'
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Stevens in
dissenting.' Justice Stevens stated that the commerce power and the
Necessary and Proper Clause gave Congress "ample authority" to pass
In support of this position, the dissent stood in
the Brady Act."
to
Justice Rehnquist's dictum on the Tenth Amendopposition
direct
ment. The dissent stressed that while the First Amendment prohibits
certain categories of laws, the Tenth Amendment "imposes no restriction
on the exercise of delegated powers.""'
Justice Souter also wrote a separate dissent in which he engaged
Justice Scalia's interpretation of a passage from The Federalist No.
27."° In the passage, Hamilton wrote:
[T]he legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective members[,]
(i.e., the states,] will be incorporated into the operations of the national

government as faras [the nationalgovernment'sJjust and constitutional authority extends, and [the legislatures, courts, and magistrates of
the respective members] will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement

of [the national government's] laws."°

Justice Scalia understood Hamilton to mean no more than that state
governments have a duty to refrain from creating obstructions to, and
interfering with, federal law's proper operation."°

Justice Souter, on

97. Id.
98. Id.

99. Id. at 2382.
100. Id.
101. Id.

102. Id. at 2386 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 2387.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2402 (Souter, J., dissenting).
106. THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 177 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
107. 117 S. Ct. at 2374.
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the other hand, found this same passage determinative of his position in
favor of the constitutionality of the Brady Act.'"
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

Harry N. Schieber opens his article Federalism' with a discussion
of Woodrow Wilson's belief that each successive generation of Americans
must reconsider the question of federalism, the question regarding the
relationship between the federal and state governments."' The debate
in Printz v. United States between Justices Scalia and Souter over the
proper interpretation of The Federalist No. 2711 points out that the
question of federalism was not settled at the Constitutional Convention.112 Justice Scalia points to scholarship suggesting that even
Publius was of a divided mind on the question."" And as Justice
O'Connor stated in New York v. United States, federalism is "perhaps
our oldest question of constitutional law."" 4
As early as McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice John Marshall
predicted that "the question respecting the extent of the [federal
government's] powers ... is perpetually arising, and will probably
continue to arise, so long as our system shall exist.""' Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in McCulloch, which limited state exercise of
sovereignty over the people of the United States to whom the governments of individual states are not politically answerable, 116 rests
ultimately upon a fundamental tenet of federalism. This tenet is that
the United States is not a compact between the states; it is rather a
coequal sovereign with the states."'
After the ascendancy of the Federalist party in the early government
of the United States, the presidency of Andrew Jackson initiated an era
that gave voice to the proponents of states' rights, an era that ended

108. Id at 2402 (Souter, J., dissenting).
109. Harry N. Schieber, Federalism, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 278-87 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992) [hereinafter OXFORD
COMPANION].
110. Id. at 278.
111. THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 174-77 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
112. 117 S. Ct. at 2375 n.9.
113. Id. (citing D. BRAVEMAN ET. AL., CONSTITTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS
IN OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM 198-99 (3d ed. 1996)).
114. 505 U.S. at 149.
115. 17 U.S. at 405.
116. Id. at 436.
117. Id. at 402-05.
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with the catastrophe of the Civil War. 118 In contrast to the Jacksonian
mood of the mid-nineteenth century, in United States v. Darby,"9
decided during the New Deal era of the mid-twentieth century, the Court
expanded congressional power to regulate commerce, holding that this
authority was "attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise
of [the States'] police power[s." 20 The court in Darby expressly
overruled earlier cases,' 2 ' and propounded the position that the Tenth
Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered. "122
Stating that the Tenth Amendment "is not without significance," the
Court began to give ground on this dictum in Fry."2 Seizing upon the
"'not without significance'" statement in National League of Cities,24
Justice Rehnquist initiated a progression in the federalism debate that
has, at present, culminated in Printz. While Printz may seem to
approach an interpretation of United States federalism more consistent
with that of the Jacksonian era, it is probably not the case that the
federalism debate presently stands anywhere near its pre-Civil War
position. Barring catastrophic events comparable to the Civil War,
Justice Thomas's dissent to U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,"2 in
which he suggests that United States federalism should be understood
as a compact between the states, is most likely inapplicable to the
structural realities and possibilities of the contemporary United States.
Nevertheless, should the decision in Printz prove resilient, congressional
power to act under the commerce power is now significantly limited, and
Congress will have to find other means to enlist state compliance with
federal objectives. The spending power is perhaps the most ready
means. In accordance with South Dakota v. Dole, 26 Congress may
condition state receipt of federal funds on compliance with federal policy
objectives.17
118. Richard E. Ellis, McCulloch v. Maryland,in OXFORD COMPANION, supranote 109,
at 536-38.
119. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
120. Id. at 114.
121. Id. at 116 (overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (preventing
Congress from using commerce power to address problem of child labor)).
122. Id. at 123-24.
123. 421 U.S. at 547 n.7.
124. 426 U.S. at 842-43 (quoting Fry, 421 U.S. at 547 n.7).
125. 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas wrote in his
dissent: "The ultimate source of the Constitution's authority is the consent of the people
of each individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a
whole." Id. at 846.
126. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
127. Id. at 206-07.
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Congress may also elect to forgo state participation in certain areas of
regulation. For example, the Court in FERC stated that Congress could
have totally pre-empted state regulation of utilities.1
Likewise, in
Hodel the Court stated that Congress could have pre-empted the field of
surface mining regulation by denying the states any role whatsoever in
the regulation of surface mining."' Ironically, forcing Congress to
take this approach works against any ostensible policy objective favoring
the enhancement of state power within the federal system. The dissent
to Printz recognizes this, pointing out that "[iun the name of States
rights, the majority would have the Federal Government
create vast
180
national bureaucracies to implement its policies.
If indeed the results of this decision ultimately run contrary to the
decentralization of the power that the federal government has acquired
over the course of the twentieth century and if the results of the decision
run contrary to the investiture of power in more local polities as the
dissent expects, Printz could come to be regarded as a decision adverse
to any meaningful contribution to the federalism debate that a theory of
states' rights might make. But as Chief Justice Marshall pointed out,
the United States federalism debate is quintessentially perennial. Printz
is but the latest installment, and not the final chapter, in the nation's
ongoing consideration of its federalist nature.
KEVIN TODD BUTLER

128. 456 U.S. at 764-65.
129. 452 U.S. at 290-91.
130. 117 S. Ct. at 2896 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

